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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
vs.

:

DAVID R. WARDEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Case No. 880575-CA
(Argument Priority - 2)

Brief of Respondent

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of

Appeals to hear this appeal by 78-2a-3(2)(d) U.C.A. (1988 Supp.),
77-35-26(4) (a) U.C.A. (1988 Supp.), and Rule 26 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
2.

Defendant appeals from his conviction by jury of

negligent homicide in the Second Circuit Court, State of Utah,
Davis County, Layton Department.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove that

Defendant's conduct caused the death of Jareth Young?
2.

Was there sufficient and competent evidence to

prove that defendant acted with criminal negligence?
4

3.

Was the State's expert testimony properly admitted?

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
In September 1986, the defendant, a physician, attended

a 19-year-old unwed female with regard to her pregnancy and
agreed to attend the delivery of the expected child in the home
of the patient.

At that time the defendant estimated the

expected date of delivery to be December 17, 1986.
On November 7, 1986, defendant, knowing the
circumstances evidenced pre-term labor, attended the birth of the
child at the home and diagnosed the newborn as suffering from
respiratory distress syndrome and stated that the child was
premature.

When asked if the child should be hospitalized, the

defendant indicated that it would not be necessary and left the
infant in the care of his mother and grandmother.
The infant died within 12 1/2 hours of birth from
respiratory distress syndrome due to prematurity.
An expert witness testified that had the child been
taken to the University of Utah Neonatology Intensive Care Unit,
the child would have had a 99% chance of survival.
Defendant was charged and convicted of the crime of
Negligent Homicide in connection with the death of the child.
is that conviction from which the defendant now appeals.

5

It

B.

Course of Proceedings,
Defendant was initially tried by jury beginning

November 16, 1987. However, the Court declared a mistrial on
November 18, 1987 due to improper testimony given by one of the
State7s witnesses (R. at page 3).
A second jury trial was held beginning February 22,
1988, which continued through February 26, 1988,

Defendant was

convicted of the offense as charged (R. at page 7 ) .
C.

Disposition at Trial Court,
On March 11, 1988, the defendant filed a Motion to

Arrest Judgment (R. at pages 73 through 133). The Motion was
heard April 7, 1988 (R. at page 7).

The Court denied the Motion

in a written decision dated June 23, 1988 (R. at pages 154
through 159).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged in the Fourth Circuit Court,
Layton Department, with the Negligent Homicide of Jareth Young,
the infant son of Joanne Young.
Joanne Young is a citizen of England and came to the
United States in July of 1984, when she was fifteen years old
(Transcript, hereinafter referred to as T. Vol.Ill, p.39).
During the month of March, 1986, she became pregnant at the age
of seventeen years (T. Vol.Ill, p.40).
In July, 1986, Joanne went to Dr. Mark Bitner, a board
certified obstetrician/gynecologist, who confirmed that she was
6

indeed pregnant.

Dr. Bitner established the projected date of

confinement at about December 21, 1986 (T. Vol.11, p.175).
Joanne's recollection was that the due date was December 10th (T.
Vol.Ill, p.43).
Joanne learned that the defendant did home deliveries
and decided she wanted a home delivery because she was too
embarrassed at being pregnant out-of-wedlock and did not want to
go to a hospital and have people know (T. Vol.Ill, p.48).
Joanne first went to Dr. Warden on September 8th (T.
Vol.Ill, p.50).

He established her due date as being December

17th (T. Vol.Ill, p.53).

Joanne was not given any instruction by

Dr. Warden as to what to do should anything unusual occur nor was
she given instruction as to the care of the baby (T. Vol.Ill,
p.57) .
At approximately 8 o'clock on the morning of November
7th, Joanne discovered she was having cramps and was bleeding an
amount of blood consistent with a heavy day of a normal menstrual
period (T. Vol.Ill, pp. 60-63).

Joanne's mother, Ivy Young, made

a phone call to Dr. Warden, who was at the University of Utah,
attending a football game.

Dr. Warden told her not to worry,

that Joanne was in labor (T. Vol.1, p.61).

He instructed her to

call back at 1:00 p.m. (T. Vol.1, p.62).
Ivy called again at 1:00 p.m. (T. Vol.1, p.64) and was
told not to bring Joanne to the clinic (T. Vol.1, p.65).

Ivy

phoned again at 4:00 p.m. to inform the defendant that Joanne was
losing blood clots, at which time he told her to "stop fussing"
7

(T. Vol.1, p.66).

Ivy called again at about 10:15 p.m. to tell

the defendant that Joanne was in the last stages of labor (T.
Vol-1, p.67) .
The defendant arrived at the Young home at approximately
10:30 p.m. (T. Vol.1, p.68) and the baby, Jareth Young, was born
within a matter of minutes (T. Vol.Ill, p.74, also T. Vol.1,
p.76).

Ivy then weighed the infant on the bathroom scales and

reported to Dr. Warden that the weight of the baby was about four
pounds (T. Vol.1, p.73).
Soon after the birth, Ivy noted that the infant made
unusual sounds, "like a pig grunting" (T. Vol.1, p.78).

She also

noticed that the hands and torso of the baby were purplish-blue
(T. Vol.1, p.79).

Ivy repeatedly requested that Defendant check

Jareth (T. Vol.1, pp.73,82,83,84).

Defendant diagnosed the baby

as suffering from respiratory distress syndrome and suggested
that positioning the baby would relieve the syndrome (T. Vol.Ill,
p.98) and decided not to hospitalize the baby (T. Vol.IV, pp.175177) .
Defendant remained at the Young home for about an hour.
The only instructions he gave to Ivy Young was to watch the baby
through the night (T. Vol.1, p.86) and if she needed help to call
(T. Vol.11, p.115).

He did not tell her that the baby could die

of the respiratory condition.(T. Vol.IV, p.184).
In the morning when Jareth's condition had
deteriorated, Ivy Young attempted to contact the defendant at his
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office (T. Vol.1, p.95), at his home (T. Vol.1, p.96), and again
at his office (T. Vol.1, p.98) with no success.
Finally, she contacted her bishop in the LDS Church (T.
Vol.1, p.98), who responded with a pediatrician, Dr. Kramer (T.
Vol.1, p.101).

The infant was transferred to the hospital but

died soon thereafter (T. Vol.1, p.104).
The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin S. Sweeney,
testified that Jareth Young died of Respiratory Distress
Syndrome, due to prematurity (T. Vol.Ill, p.13).

He opined that

the weight of the child was about four pounds (T. Vol.Ill, p.15),
and that the gestational age of the baby was 3 3 - 34 weeks (T.
Vol.Ill, p.34).
According to Dr. Kramer (T. Vol.11, p.247) and Dr.
Branch (T. Vol.Ill, p.162), there is no recognized specialty in
home delivery in the State of Utah.
Dr. Frank Kramer, a board certified pediatrician who
came to the home at the request of the LDS bishop and attended
the infant until his death at Humana Davis North Hospital,
testified that based upon the physical size of the baby, one
could tell it was not a well child (T. Vol.11, p.276).

Dr.

Kramer testified that the baby should have been hospitalized
immediately following birth (T. Vol.11, p.277), and that Jareth
Young was obviously premature (T. Vol.11, p.280).

Finally, Dr.

Kramer testified that the local hospital, Humana Davis North, has
a policy that a mother should be sent to a center with an
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intensive care unit if the mother is felt to be less than 35
weeks of gestation (T. Vol.11 p.281).
Dr. Ware Branch, an obstetrician-gynecologist for the
University of Utah, testified that he teaches obstetrics at the
University of Utah College of Medicine, teaching general
principles of obstetrics to medical students and residents and
understands the standard of care of both general practitioners
and other specialists in the area of obstetrics (T. Vol.Ill,
pp.162-163).

The general principles in that regard do not vary

from a doctor practicing in a hospital setting as opposed to a
home setting (T. Vol.Ill, p.164).
When given hypothetical facts equivalent to the
situation of this case up to 8:00 a.m. on November 7, 1986, Dr.
Branch indicated that the standard of care would be to see the
patient for evaluation for the use of tocolysis, or stopping
labor (T. Vol.Ill, p.179).
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Branch
about the standard of care regarding leaving a baby in Jareth7s
condition with the family at home, and Branch replied, "... in my
opinion, this baby has to be observed in the hospital setting..."
(T. Vol.Ill, p.225).
Finally, Dr. Branch in evaluating the course of action
taken by Dr. Warden, stated, "... what would I tell a resident in
training?

He better not ever, ever do that again or I711 see to

it that he's on the street."

He then elaborated, "Well, I mean,

I have, in discussion with you here today, disagreed with the
10

prospective management of the events of the 7th of November and I
would disagree with them again."

(T. Vol.Ill, p.225).

Further, he stated, "I think that the judgment decision
to leave a small, quite likely premature baby in the hands of
someone who doesn't really have any medical experience, I think
that judgment is far too liberal for these times and I wouldn't
do that."

(T. Vol.Ill, p.227).
Dr. Gary Chan, a neonatologist for the University of

Utah, testified that he has taught interns and residents in
training, in pediatrics, family practice, anesthesiology, and
obstetrics, and is familiar with the standards of practice in all
of those areas (T. Vol.Ill, p.235), and further, that the
standard would not vary from a hospital to a home-birth setting
(T. Vol.Ill, p.276).

He stated the standard of care for a baby

of four pounds and 33 to 34 weeks gestation age "... would
certainly be admitted to a newborn intensive care unit." (T.
Vol.Ill, p.239).
Given a hypothetical circumstance consistent with that
of the birth of Jareth Young, Dr. Chan stated that if Jareth were
immediately in his care in the hospital intensive care unit, the
probability of survival would have been 99 per cent (T. Vol.Ill,
p.248) .
Dr. Chan also stated that any physician should be able
to recognize if the baby was in respiratory distress (T. Vol.Ill,
p.249) and failure to treat the baby would result in increased
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risk of mortality to five, ten, or fifteen per cent (T. Vol.Ill,
p.250).
When asked if it would be within the standard of care in
this area for physicians to leave that baby in a home setting
with a lay person monitoring the progress of that baby
immediately after birth, Dr. Chan's response was, "Absolutely
not." (T. Vol.Ill, pp.256, 273). He later stated the risk of
death to a baby left in the care of a lay person would increase
10 to 20 times.
Dr. Chan stated the grunting sound was symptomatic of
respiratory distress (T. Vol.Ill, p.276).

It is possible to

adjust the position of the baby to eliminate the sound, but it
dees not affect the exertion of the baby or the progress of the
disease (T. Vol.Ill, p.277).

This testimony was in direct

contradiction to Dr. Warden's.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Respondent makes three arguments in response to
Appellant's brief:
1.

Defendant caused the death of Jareth Young.

Defendant was aware of the risk of death to Jareth Young and
assumed a position of responsibility for the health of Jareth.
He knew that the family relied upon his expertise for the
diagnosis and treatment of the baby.

In spite of those

circumstances, he refused to come to the home or to his own
clinic to make proper evaluation of what was consistent with
12

signs of premature labor.

He diagnosed Respiratory Distress

Syndrome and withheld all information regarding diagnosis,
prognosis, treatment, and possible outcome from the family.

He

instead prescribed a positioning therapy which is ineffective in
affecting the progress of the disease, but instead hides the most
obvious symptom.

All of this created a circumstance of peril for

Jareth Young of which only defendant was aware until the infant
was moribund•
2.

The Actus Reus of negligent homicide is the causing

of the death of the victim*
is criminal negligence.

The mens rea of Negligent Homicide

Part of the proof of criminal negligence

is a showing of a risk of the nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care of an ordinary person in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's viewpoint.

The standard is an %ordinary person7

standard and need not be proven by expert witnesses.

In any

event, intent in a criminal case never needs to be proven by
expert testimony and may be inferred by the circumstances.
3.

The State's experts were qualified to testify and

their testimony was properly admitted.
helpful to the jury.

Their testimony was

There is no recognized specialty in home

deliveries and any physician who is aware of the standard of
care for delivery and immediate aftercare of infants may testify
where the standard does not vary from one specialty to another.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE CAUSE OF
JARETH YOUNG'S DEATH
The evidence is that Defendant created a situation of
peril for Jareth Young by assuming a position of responsibility
for the medical well-being of Jareth Young, determining that
Jareth suffered from Respiratory Distress Syndrome, then failing
to have him properly treated and increasing the peril by leaving
him with uninformed laymen.
Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence
to establish a causal relationship between defendant's conduct
and the death of Jareth Young.

This court has adopted the

following standard with regard to a challenge for sufficiency of
the evidence:
"In reviewing a claim of insufficient
evidence, this Court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict and
will interfere only when the evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable
person would not possibly have reached a
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Jamison, 99 Utah Adv.Rpt. 32, 34 (1989),
quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539,550
(Utah 1983).
Jareth Young died of Respiratory Distress Syndrome due
to prematurity, according to the State Medical Examiner, Dr.
Edwin Sweeney.

Defendant, by his acts or omissions in this case,

failed to (A) take reasonable steps to assess the possibility of
preventing the premature birth by tocolysis, (B) properly treat
14

the Respiratory Distress Syndrome, (C) transport the victim to a
facility where the syndrome could be properly treated, and (D)
inform Ivy Young of the risks involved and symptoms to observe.
(A). TOCOLYSIS.

Dr. Branch's testimony indicated that

the defendant should have gone to Joanne Young upon the
indication that she was bleeding in order to evaluate for the use
of tocolysis, or the stopping of labor (T. Vol.Ill, p.179).
The Defendant admitted that he was aware of the
technology and the considerations involved in tocolysis
(T. Vol.Ill, pp.129-131).

He testified that tocolysis is not

possible in the home setting (T. Vol.Ill, p.131).

Yet the

defendant declined to come to evaluate Joanne Young in person,
opting instead to make his decision based upon a telephone call
with the grandmother, Ivy Young.

The defendant declined to come

to the house until the contractions were three minutes apart.
In fact, the Defendant testified that he elected not to
go on the basis of his diagnosis that the patient was in false
labor (T. Vol.Ill, p.163).

It is not possible, at this point, to

know whether tocolysis was a possibility.

Had it been possible,

it would have prevented the prematurity of Jareth Young.

The

failure to examine and evaluate for the application of tocolysis
may not in itself evidence proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant caused the death of Jareth Young.

In the totality of

the circumstances, however, the failure to evaluate evidences one
of the many opportunities Defendant had to avert the substantial
and unjustifiable risk of death arising from this premature
15

birth.
(B). IMPROPER TREATMENT.

Defendant testified that he

diagnosed the infant as suffering from Respiratory Distress
Syndrome (T. Vol.Ill, p.97).

His treatment was to improve the

respiratory effort and breathing of the infant by positioning the
baby (T. Vol.Ill, p.98).

He stated that at that time he believed

the baby would do far better in the hospital (T. Vol.Ill, p.97).
Yet, when he was asked about hospitalizing the baby he said it
would not be necessary (T. Vol. II p. 126).
Dr. Chan testified that positioning the baby does
nothing to affect the exertion of the baby or the progress of the
disease (T. Vol.Ill, p.277).
If the jury accepted Dr. Chan's testimony over that of
Dr. Warden, they could have easily concluded (1) that Dr. Warden
properly diagnosed the disease, (2) that he improperly treated
the disease, (3) that he created the peril by minimizing the
seriousness of the symptoms to both Sharon and Ivy Young, (4)
that he further created the peril by teaching a positioning
method which merely masked the symptom making it imperceptible to
a lay person, and (5) that he breached his duty to care for the
infant by leaving it in the care of laypersons who did not have
the expertise to recognize the progress of the disease.
(C).

FAILURE TO HOSPITALIZE.

The defendant failed to

hospitalize his patient at two critical points in his management
of the case.

The first point was prior to the delivery.

Dr.

Branch testified that given the circumstances prospectively that
16

presented themselves prior to the delivery of Jareth Young:
"Given the setting of the patient,
probably if not—possibly if not probably
being in pre-term labor, given the setting
that she's having some bleeding that is as yet
unidentified in terms of etiology, and given
the probability of labor, you know, my opinion
is the baby is going to do better in a
hospital. The reason is very simple. It
provides immediate capability for oxygenation
and carbon dioxide exchange." (T. Vol.Ill,
p.184) .
The second point at which the defendant failed to
hospitalize the baby was after the delivery and diagnosis of
Respiratory Distress Syndrome.

Dr. Chan testified that treatment

of Respiratory Distress Syndrome needs to be done in a tertiary
care facility, of which there are four locally:

University of

Utah, L.D.S. Hospital, McKay-Dee, and Utah Valley (T. Vol.Ill,
p.240).

Dr. Warden indicated he was familiar with the disease

and, although he had no formal training, he was familiar and had
experience in that regard (T. Vol.IV, p.131).

He further stated

that of the home births he had attended involving pre-term labor,
eight out of ten developed Respiratory Distress Syndrome and
three out of ten were ultimately admitted to the hospital for
treatment (T. Vol.IV, p.132).

Yet the defendant decided not to

hospitalize in this case.
On cross-examination of the defendant, the following
exchange occurred regarding that decision:
Q:

We have a risk here, a child who obviously is

exhibiting the symptoms of respiratory distress syndrome; is that
right?
17

A:

Correct.

Q:

You're aware of that risk?

A:

Yes.

Q:

You're aware that this child could, if it worsens,

die from that, are you not?
A:

That's correct.

B:

You're aware of all those factors?

A:

Yes.

Q:

You have a grandmother here that you have confidence

in relative to her care of that child, right?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Now at that point in time, you elect in your own

mind, exercise that judgment and you elect not to recommend that
the child be take to the hospital at that time; is that right?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Now you're also aware, are you not, Doctor, as to

the progressive nature of this disease?
A:

Yes, I am.

Q:

And you're also aware, are you not, that exercising

caution in these circumstances is of the utmost importance to the
life of that child?
A:

That's correct. (T. Vol.IV, pp.175-177)

In fact, Defendant was not authorized to admit the
infant into any hospital because he had no malpractice insurance
(T. Vol.IV p. 122-124).

In the event the defendant had decided

to hospitalize the child, he would have had to call a physician
18

to admit the child or take the child to the emergency room as any
other person might (T. Vol.IV, pp.126-127).
D.

Failure to Adequately Inform Ivy Young.

The actions

of Ivy Young subsequent to Defendant leaving the house do not
vindicate defendant nor relieve him from criminal responsibility.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
11

(W) here a party by his wrongful conduct
creates a condition of peril, his action can
properly be found to be the proximate cause of
a resulting injury, even though later events
which combined to cause the injury may also be
classified as negligent, so long as the later
act is something which can reasonably be
expected to follow in the natural sequence of
events." State v. Hallett. 619 P.2d 335,339
(Utah 1930).
Defendant claims that the failure of Ivy Young to take
some action was an intervening cause.

The question then is

whether the jury could reasonably conclude that Ivy's actions
were reasonably expected to follow.

In fact, her failure to act

was not only reasonably expected, but caused by Defendant's
reassurances that action was not needed.

Defendant had

consistently minimized the concerns of Ivy Young during the day
of the delivery; refusing to come to see Joanne and telling Ivy
to "stop fussing."
The defendant admitted on the stand that he was the only
person with the ability to recognize the risk:
Q:

Doctor, you also don't dispute the fact that this

child, on the date in question when you delivered it, exhibited
the symptomatology of hyaline membrane or respiratory distress
syndrome, do you?
19

A:

That's correct.

Q:

And you don't dispute the fact that the ability and

experience and objectivity to observe and diagnose such a disease
relative to respiratory distress syndrome, that nobody but you in
that home birth setting had the ability to do that, do you?
A:

No,

Q:

No, you do dispute that?

A:

No, I don't dispute it.

Q:

You were the only person who had the expertise and

No, I don't.

the ability to make those observations and make that
determination, weren't you?
A:

That's correct. (T. Vol. IV, pp.210,211).

Ivy Young's testimony was that Defendant gave her no
instructions regarding hospitalization, symptoms, diagnosis, or
prognosis, but simply told her to watch the baby through the
night (T. Vol. I pp.85-86).
Defendant's testimony, at most, was that he asked her to
watch for "changes" in temperature, color, and respirations (T.
Vol.IV pp.101-102,183-184).

She was given no objective means of

measuring what constituted a significant change.

Indeed, the

infant was already colder than a normal baby, bluer than a normal
baby, and breathing in a abnormal manner.

The defendant's

statement on cross-examination as to his instruction to Ivy was:
Q:

...did you tell her that if these things continued

that it could result in death to the child?

20

A:

I did not tell her that it could result in the death

of the child.
Q:

Did you tell her that it would require immediate

hospitalization if any of these things occurred?
A:

Yes.

Q:

You did?

A:

Yes.

Q:

In what context did you tell her that?

A:

In the hallway I told her that if this baby had a

worsening condition that she should call and we would probably
need to admit it to the hospital.
Q:

We would probably need to admit it to the hospital?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

Is that telling her that it would need immediate

hospitalization, Doctor?
A:

No. (T. Vol.IV, pp.134-185)

Even if the court accepts the defendant's account of the
instructions given to Ivy Young, the evidence from the medical
experts is that the symptoms Defendant allegedly instructed Ivy
to watch for would not necessarily be helpful in determining the
progress of the disease.
With regard to respiratory effort, Dr. Kramer testified
that an infant becoming critical in it's progress in the disease
might have "...heavier breathing and grunting, retraction; it's
an indication that the child is not doing well, but again, some
babies don't have those symptoms.
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They just kind of be quiet,

and if their intoxicating themselves, they may not show too
much." (T. Vol. II p.311).

Dr. Chan testified that when the baby

is becoming moribund or near death it may become quieter than it
had been before (T. Vol.Ill, pp.244-245).

In other words, if the

grunting became better, not worse, it would, in fact be an
indication of deterioration rather than improvement.
With regard to color, Dr. Kramer stated, "The color may
be somewhat bluish, very pale, but color is not very helpful.

It

may misjudge the condition of a child just by color." (T. Vol.11,
p.288) .
Both Dr. Kramer and Dr. Chan testified about a "crash"
which Dr. Chan described as a "sudden change in the baby's vital
signs."

Dr. Chan testified that temperature is not an indicator

of the "crash" (T. Vol.Ill p.244) and that a lay person could not
objectively monitor the progress of the disease (T. Vol. Ill
p.253).

In this case, by Defendant's account, Ivy Young was

under instructions to watch for changes in respiration,
temperature, and color and to act upon changes in those symptoms.
In fact, the respirations did not become more labored,
but less labored as described by Dr. Chan, a symptom Ivy would
have taken for improvement but really meant a "crash".
changes in color or temperature were subtle.

Any

Ivy's inaction is

attributable, therefore, to Dr. Warden's failure to adequately
instruct Ivy, and therefore reasonably expected.
It is also important to note that had Ivy been
successful in contacting Defendant, at best, Defendant's reaction
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would have been to have the infant admitted to a hospital.
Defendant claims now that the delay in hospitalization was the
fault of Ivy Young and not of the defendant•

Yet when the infant

was hospitalized it was through the emergency room of the local
hospital, Humana Davis North (T. Vol.11 p. 264), not a tertiary
care hospital equipped to treat a neonate for respiratory
distress as described by Dr. Chan (T. Vol.Ill p.240).

Nowhere

in the record is there any evidence that Defendant informed Ivy
Young that the child would have to be treated in a tertiary care
hospital, nor did he describe to her the nature of the treatment
that would be required if hospitalized.

Defendant was the only

person present who had that knowledge.
It is therefore a reasonable conclusion of the jury that
the Defendant created the peril by abandoning Jareth Young in the
care of a lay person, the grandmother, who was not instructed in
either the symptoms to observe or the possible consequence.

Ivy

Young was not an intervening cause, but a part of the peril
created by Defendant.

But for the fact that the defendant

attended the infant, allayed the fears of the family regarding
the size and symptoms of the disease, and instructed them that
the grunting was common in premature babies, the baby would have
been hospitalized at the time of birth.

That Ivy Young would not

recognize the gravity of the situation based upon these
circumstances is clearly foreseeable.
This court should not substitute its own opinion for the
jury's finding with regard to this issue.
23

Where there is

sufficient evidence for the jury to come to the conclusion that
Ivy's actions were reasonably foreseeable, this court should
abide by that decision,
"Moreover, when reasonable minds might
differ as to whether it was the creation of
the dangerous condition (defendant's conduct)
which was the proximate cause, or whether it
was some subsequent act (such as Ms. Carley's
driving), the question is for the trier of
fact to determine." Hallet, supra at 339.
POINT II
THE STATE HAD NO BURDEN TO PROVE GROSS
DEVIATION BY EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY AND MET
ITS BURDEN TO PROVE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.
A.

Expert medical testimony is not a requirement to

prove intent in a criminal action against a doctor.
Appellants comparison of this criminal case to a
medical malpractice case is an "apples to oranges" comparison
because the standard of care in a criminal case applies to the
mens rea while the standard of care in a malpractice case applies
to the conduct.
The cases cited by appellant regarding degree of
deviation from a standard of care all deal with conduct rather
than intent.

The court in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,351

(Utah 1980) stated:
"Before the Plaintiff can prevail in a
medical malpractice action, he must establish
both the standard of care required of the
Defendant as a practicing physician in the
community and the Defendant's failure to
employ that standard. (emphasis added)
Id at 351
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The definition of criminal negligence mentions "standard
of care11 in order to clarify the nature of the risk:
"The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint," (emphasis added)
U.C.A. 76-2-103 (4) (1953 as amended)
Since the statute refers to risk rather than conduct,
the prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant acted
in gross deviation from the standard.

Indeed, if the state were

to be required to prove such, there would be no distinction
between criminal negligence and recklessness since both
definitions contain the language "gross deviation".
The burden on the state is to prove that the risk was of
the seriousness, obviousness, and within the control of the
defendant to the "...degree that the failure to perceive (the
risk) constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id.

Competent evidence

to show the nature and degree of the risk and the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint is sufficient to sustain
the prosecution's burden.

This again is an issue for the jury

which should not be disturbed by this court.
"It is the exclusive province of the jury
to grade the degree of culpability. Intent
need not be directly proved but may be
inferred." State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566,
569 (Utah 1983).
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B.

Expert medical witnesses are not a requirement to

prove criminal negligence in a negligent homicide case involving
a medical doctor.
The "degree of deviation" is measured from an "ordinary
person standard of care" and not a "medical standard of care" and
does not require expert testimony•
The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint, (emphasis added)
U.C.A. 76-2-103(4) (1953 as amended)
A statute carries with it the presumption that it is
valid, and that the words and phrases were chosen advisedly to
express the legislative intent,
449 (Utah 1967).

Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d

The legislature here specified that the

standard for measurement in criminal negligence is an ordinary
man standard.

It is not required that mental state be proven by

expert testimony.
In the case of State v. Nicholson 585 P.2d 60 (Utah
1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that for purposes of our
homicide statute the court is not bound to accept expert
testimony with regard to malice.

Nicholson dealt with a homicide

charged as a second degree murder based upon the theory of
depraved indifference.

Expert testimony was produced by the

defendant to show that she hallucinated, suffered from severe
depression, and did not know what to do for her children.

The

appellant sought a finding that the case should be reduced to
26

Manslaughter or Negligent Homicide because the expert testimony
was consistent with recklessness or criminal negligence.

The

trial court found the expert testimony * unbelievable and
inconsistent with the other evidence and convicted of Second
Degree Murder.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision saying,

"(m)alice may be express or implied." Nicholson, supra at 62.
It is illogical to conclude that the lower mental state
of Criminal Negligence must be proven by expert testimony.
Appellant asserts that because he is a medical doctor
the rule must be different and expert testimony must establish
the mental state.

He asserts that only medical experts can

establish the standard of care by which he should be measured.
To hold in Appellant's favor on this issue prejudices all other
homicide defendants and denies them equal protection.

No

individual ought to be able to require a higher degree of proof
for conviction of a criminal offense based upon his education or
profession.
C

Even if the state had a burden to prove Defendant's

conduct was grossly negligent by competent medical experts, the
state met that burden.
Although no expert witness gave a direct opinion in the
exact words "gross deviation", Dr. Branch's statement succinctly
shows he felt Defendant's conduct grossly negligent:
"...what would I tell a resident in training?

He better

not ever, ever do that again or I'll see to it that he's on the
street."

(T. Vol.Ill, p.225)
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Dr. Chan's emphatic statement when asked if the
hypothetical was within the standard of care was "absolutely
not." (T. Vol.Ill, pp.256).

He then went on to say that while

the chances of survival in a neonate facility would be 99%, this
child's chances of dying when left with a lay person increases
ten to twenty times (T. Vol.Ill, p.273).
D.

Proof given by competent medical experts was

sufficient to give jurors an understanding of "...all the
circumstances from the point of view of the defendant." U.C.A.
76-2-103(4) (1953 as amended).
Even in medical malpractice cases where the impropriety
is of such a nature that lay persons could judge from common
knowledge and experience that such injury would not happen if
there had been proper skill and care, expert testimony is not
necessary as to the standard of skill and care required of the
physician.

Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980).

The exception is typical of cases where instruments are
left in patients during surgery, but has also been applied to a
case where a chiropractor violently jerked the neck of a patient.
Malmstrom v. Olsen, 400 P.2d 209 (Utah 1965).
Here there is competent evidence that the victim was
suffering a progressive and potentially fatal disease which could
be treated by another physician with a 99% certainty of survival
if treated in a nearby and accessible hospital.

It is within the

common knowledge and experience of lay jurors that it would be
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grossly negligent to leave that child in the hands of a lay
person.
Even if the court finds that the standard of medical
malpractice suits should be used in a criminal case, the state
met that burden because the impropriety of Defendants acts are
within the common knowledge and experience of laymen.
A case cited by Appellant holds that "...expert
testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed
the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is
within the common knowledge and experience of laymen."
Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980).
The major aspect of defendant's conduct which the state
asserts was negligent is the failure to hospitalize the victim,
prior to, during and after the delivery.

The defendant is not

authorized to practice in a hospital, nor does he have the
expertise or authorization to perform tocolysis or oxygenation in
a neonate facility.

The decision not to hospitalize is therefore

less a medical decision than one based on common knowledge,
experience, economics, and probability.

The defendant testified

that he made the decision based on his feeling that Ivy Young
could make what he considered common sense observations. (T.
Vol.IV, p.177).
Defendant asserts that Ivy Young was an intervening
cause because she should have perceived the baby's worsening
condition.

If one accepts that position, then the decisions of

the defendant were clearly within the Nixdorf exception.
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POINT III
THE STATE'S EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED
A.

The expert medical testimony presented by the State

was properly admitted under U.R.E, 702.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the acts of
the defendant evidencing the nature and degree of the risk were
established by expert medical testimony.

The expert medical

testimony presented by the state was properly admitted because it
conformed to the only rule of evidence applicable to the
situation:
"If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 702.
The standard for the jury in this case is "the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint."
2-103(4).

U.C.A. 76-

Since the standard is an ^ordinary person standard',

the expert medical testimony is not necessary, but merely helpful
or likely to "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence."
B.

Even under the medical malpractice model, the

State's expert testimony was admissible because there is no
recognized specialty in home delivery and the standard of care
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for the delivery and immediate aftercare of infants is common to
all specialties.
The standard for medical experts testifying in cases in
medical malpractice actions is well established:
11

...[A]n expert witness belonging to one
school may competently testify against a
member of another school once sufficient
foundation has been laid to show that the
method of treatment - and hence the standard
of care - is common to both schools. "
Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245 at 248
(Utah 1935).
One of the state's witnesses, Dr. Ware Branch, testified
that he taught at the University of Utah Medical School.

He

testified that there was no recognized specialty in home
deliveries in the State of Utah to his knowledge (T. Vol.Ill
p.186).

He testified that he taught both residents of obstetrics

and gynecology as well as general principles of Obstetrics and
Gynecology to medical students on rotations.

He testified that

he was familiar with the standard of care for physicians
generally, general practitioners, and specialists and that the
general principles constituting the standard of care would not
vary from a doctor practicing in a hospital setting as opposed to
a home setting.
Dr. Chan likewise testified in cross examination, that
the standard of care would not vary from a home delivery to a
hospital delivery.

(T. Vol.Ill, p.300).

He testified that he

taught at the University of Utah to residents and interns and was
familiar with the standard of care for physicians in pediatrics,
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family practice, anesthesiology and obstetrics (T. Vol.Ill,
p.235) .
In this case, there are not two schools of thought.
There is no specialty of home birthing.

The only legitimate

school the appellant can claim is Family Practice, to which he is
board certified, but to which Dr. Branch and Dr. Chan are well
qualified to testify.
This court should not disturb the ruling of the Circuit
court in this regard:
"This court has repeatedly stated that
the trial judge has the primary responsibility
for determining whether a particular witness
qualifies as an expert and its ruling will not
be disturbed unless it was clearly in error."
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services,
667 P.2d 49,52 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSION

When a person engages a physician, he literally places
his life in the hands of the doctor.

He entrusts his faith in

the diagnostic ability of the doctor and in his judgment
regarding treatment.

This is so because the science of medicine

is so complex and the nature of the risk so personal that we do
not expect laymen to be able to objectively discern the manifold
symptoms and treatments.
The ordinary person expects his physician to make
certain decisions for him.

The ordinary person expects that when

the patient must make a decision, the doctor will provide him
with all of the available information that can be understood by a
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layman.

The purpose of that expectation is to allow the patient

to make an informed decision.

For a doctor to withhold such

information is an ethical or moral decision, but not a medical
one.
This case is not of "how to treat" but "whether to
treat" a diagnosed disease.

Defendant decided not to treat the

disease, which turned out to be a wrong decision.

Defendant now

seeks to avoid responsibility by blaming the grandmother for
failing to make a decision to have the infant treated in spite of
Defendant's decision not to treat.
Ivy Young's actions were taken in a vacuum created by
the defendant.

Defendant left the premature infant, Jareth

Young, in the care of Ivy Young without the basic information
necessary to make an informed decision.
Defendant diagnosed the disease but never shared his
diagnosis with the family.

He never told them the gravity of the

disease or the degree of the risk.

He never explained the

progressive nature of the disease.

What explanation he gave of

the symptomatology was inaccurate and misleading.

He never

explained the possible treatment, the high-tech alternatives
available, or the need to hospitalize in a tertiary treatment
facility.

He kept all of that information to himself and then

charged the grandmother with the responsibility of watching the
baby.

All of this after he had repeatedly told Ivy that her

worries were unfounded and after having rebuked her for
"fussing."
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Given those circumstances, the jury was justified in
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the
death of Jareth Young by failing to properly treat the symptoms
of Respiratory Distress and abandoning the child in the hands of
a lay person.

A substantial and unjustifiable risk of death was

created for Jareth Young, and the failure to perceive the risk
was a gross deviation from the standard of care of an ordinary
person as viewed from the Defendant's standpoint.
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ADDENDUM
Page No.
Utah Code Annotated 7 6-2-103
Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent
or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal
negligence or criminally negligent," . . . . . .

1

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702
Testimony by experts

2

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by
U 1973, en. 196, § 76-2-102.

76-2-103

Collateral References.
Criminal Law<S=>20.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 29.
21 Am. Jur. 2d 162, Criminal Law § 81.

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfully";
"fcaowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."—A person engages in conduct :
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
History: 0, 1S63, 76-2-103, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; L. 1974, eh. 32.

Collateral References.
Criminal L a w ^ 2 2 .

*
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31.
Compiler's Notes.
2 1 Am _ J u r _ 2 d 1 M > C r i m i E a l L a w § 8 2 The 1974 amendment inserted "or willfully" in subsec. (1); substituted "or Law Reviews.
maIieiou3lv" for "or is reckless" in sub„
.
Lfcah
aec. (3); "and made a minor change in
Legislative Survey—1974, 19/4
punctuation.
Utah L. Rev. 643.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
"Knowingly."
Malice was implied or presumed from
In proceeding against public official for intentional poisoning and killing of dog
receiving illegal fees, it was not error belonging
to another person; tact that
for court to define term "knowingly" in ° ™ » o f fog poisoned by detendant was
language of former Penal Code definition. finain
^ n o w n to defendant did^ not preclude
Skeen v. Chambers, 31 U. 36, 36 P. 492.
S that poison was administered mah'
'
ciously. State v. Coleman, 29 U. 41 v, 82
"Malice" and "maliciously."
F- 465.
Ifc w a a
Former Penal Code definition of malice
sufficient if the court followed
was properly given bv the court in its vsubstantially the statutory definition. State
instructions to the jury on the trial of
- Inlow, 44 U. 485, 501, 141 P. 530, Ann.
an indictment for homicide. People v. Cas. 1917A, 741.
Callaghan, 4 U. 49, 57, 6 P. 49.
"Malice," as applied to murder, waa the
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 702

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Pregnancy.
Relation to expert testimony.
Pregnancy.
The admission of a mother's testimony on
the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy
was not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).

Relation to expert testimony.
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a
security guard, who compared a photograph of
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at burglarized premises. The fact that a question
might be capable of scientific determination
does not make lay opinion inadmissible if the
provisions of this rule are met. State v. Ellis,
748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or otherwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by
lay witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258.
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testi-

mony as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.3d
575.
Competency of nonexpert witness to testify,
in criminal case, based upon personal observation, as to whether person was under the influence of drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905.

Rule 702, Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Ruie 56(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the
same.
Cross-References. — Blood tests to determine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-25-18
to 78-25-23, 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10.

Discovery of expert's opinion. Rule 26(b)(4),
U.R.C.P.
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in determining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4.
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting
number of expert witnesses, Rule 16, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Basis for opinion.
Discretion of court.
Qualification as expert.
Reliability.
Scientific evidence.
Subjects of opinion.
—Drug use.
—Identification.
Cited.
Basis for opinion.
Testimony of expert witness who relied on
conversations with witnesses out of court was
admissible, since he may have meant he found
statements of witnesses reliable for purposes of
his making judgment. Lamb v. Bangart, 525
P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
Facts or data used by a properly qualified

expert in forming an opinion need not be in
evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied
on by experts in the witness's field of expertise.
Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Trial court did not err in allowing an expert's testimony relating to drug experience reports not in evidence. Barson ex rel. Barson v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Expert's testimony was properly excluded
where witness was unable to give his opinion
based upon data made known to him at trial,
as, absent personal knowledge of the facts, this
was the only ground on which the evidence
could have come in. Highland Constr. Co. v.
Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
Discretion of court.
It is within the discretion of the trial court to
determine the suitability of expert testimony
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